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UTAH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1, SECTION 12 
[Rights of accused persons] 
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial. . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. 77-29-5 
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS 
(ADDENDUM A) 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 1, SECTION 13 
Section 13. [Prosecution by information or indictment—Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the 
accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand 
jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the 
Legislature. (As amended November 2, 1948, effective January 1, 
1949.) 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-8-1001 (1953 AS AMENDED) 
76-8-1001. Habitual Criminal-Determination. Any person who has 
been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for felony offenses 
at least one of which offenses having been at least a felony of the 
second degree or a crime which, if committed within this state would 
have been a capital felony, felony of the first degree or felony of 
the second degree, and was committed to any prison may, upon 
conviction of at least a felony of the second degree committed in 
this state, other than murder in the first or second degree, be 
determined as a habitual criminal and be imprisoned in the state 
prison for from five years to life. 
v. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony and for being an habitual 
criminal, a first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
David B. Dee, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (h) and Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-26(b)(1)(1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal 
action may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment 
of conviction of a first degree felony. 
vi. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should the charges against Mr. Stilling have been 
dismissed pursuant to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (1953 as amended) where the State 
did not bring him to trial within 120 days? 
2. Did the trial court err in failing to arraign Mr. 
Stilling and hold a preliminary hearing after Mr. Stilling returned 
to the State of Utah? 
3. Was Mr. Stilling's right to a speedy trial under Utah 
Constitution and Statutes and United States Constitutions violated? 
4. Was Mr. Stilling's right to a fair trial violated by 
the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the problems 
inherent in eyewitness identification? 
5. Did the Court violate Mr. Stilling's constitutional 
right against double jeopardy by separately sentencing him for 
aggravated robbery and for being an habitual criminal? 
vii. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : 
v. : 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, : Case No. 870094 
Defendant-Appellant. : Category No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Steven Stilling was convicted by a jury of aggravated 
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
76-6-302; Sec. 76-2-202; and Sec. 76-3-203(1-4), (1953) and being an 
habitual criminal, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 76-8-1002 (1953). The court sentenced Mr. Stilling to two 
concurrent sentences of five years to life at the Utah State Prison. 
FACTS 
On March 10, 1984, Self's Foodland was robbed by a man 
carrying what a store employee believed to be a gun. The robber, a 
white male, found the store manager in the back room of the store, 
showed the manager what he believed to be a gun and asked the 
manager to empty the safe and the checkstands (R. 839). The manager 
followed the instructions, walked with the man to the front of the 
store, emptied the safe, and then had the two women operating the 
cash registers empty the registers of the cash (R. 839-844). 
After leaving the store, the robber stopped in the 
parking lot and informed a customer that one of the checkers wanted 
to talk to him (R. 974). The three store employees and one witness 
from the parking lot described the man in general terms as having 
from light to dark hair and a medium build (R. 846). 
On April 25, 1984, Mr. Stilling was arrested in Portland, 
Oregon on fugitive warrants out of Weber County and on May 11, 1984, 
Mr. Stilling's Oregon parole was revoked and he was committed to the 
Oregon State Prison (R. 45). On April 24, Salt Lake County informed 
the Oregon State Prison that it was filing four counts of Aggravated 
Robbery against Mr. Stilling. Sometime before July 23, 1984, Salt 
Lake County filed a detainer against Mr. Stilling under the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (hereinafter l.A.D.)(Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 77-19-5 (1953 as amended)) (R. 303). Weber County also 
filed a detainer against Mr. Stilling (R. 45). 
On June 27, 1984, pursuant to Article IV(a) of the 
I.A.D., Weber County requested temporary custody of Mr. Stilling for 
prosecution (R. 303). As a result, Mr. Stilling was transported to 
the Weber County Jail on August 17, 1984 (R. 303). On July 12, 
Oregon acknowledged Weber County's request for temporary custody and 
sent Weber County the inmate status report required by the I.A.D. 
On September 19, 1984, Salt Lake County filed arrest 
warrants with Weber County Jail officials based on the same acts for 
which it had filed the detainer in Oregon (R. 109). 
Mr. Stilling was not transported from the Weber County 
Jail to Salt Lake County until January 14, 1985, 149 days after Mr. 
Stilling's arrival in Utah, and 118 days after the arrest warrants 
were filed in Weber County (R. 93). In the interim, Salt Lake 
County officials made no attempt to either continue Mr. Stilling's 
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trial or bring him to Salt Lake County. Brian Renard Allen, a South 
Salt Lake police officer, testified that there had been "a lapse" in 
his attention to Mr. Stilling's case. (R. 1720). Mr. Stilling had 
his preliminary hearing on January 29, 1985 (R. 08) and his district 
court arraignment on February 8, 1985 (R. 17), 174 days after 
Mr .Stilling's arrival in Utah and 143 days after Salt Lake County 
filed the arrest warrants with Weber County (R. 93). 
Mr. Stilling's case was originally set for trial on March 
4, 1985 (R. 20). On February 21, 1985, Mr. Stilling filed a motion 
to dismiss asking the District Court to dismiss the Salt Lake County 
charges on the grounds that the County had violated I.A.D. 
procedures when it requested custody of him and failed to bring him 
to trial within 120 days of that request (R. 47). He argued that 
the case against him should be dismissed since Salt Lake County 
failed to bring him to trial within the requisite 120 days.l He 
also argued that the I.A.D. entitled him to have Oregon officials 
review the request. 
The trial judge chose not to rule on the 120 day issue 
but did find that Salt Lake County had violated Mr. Stilling's right 
to review the transfer by Oregon's governor as required by Article 
IV(a) of the I.A.D. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R. 
260). As part of his finding, the trial judge concluded that Salt 
1 Article IV(c) provides: ff(c) In respect of any proceeding made 
possible by this Article, trial shall be commenced within one 
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving 
state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his 
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter 
may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." 
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Lake County had triggered the provisions of the I.A.D. by filing the 
detainer against Mr. Stilling while he was incarcerated in Oregon 
(R. 259-260).2 
To satisfy the requirements of the I.A.D., the trial 
judge dismissed the case and ordered that Mr. Stilling be 
immediately returned to Oregon (R. 110). The judge reserved ruling 
on the 120 day issue for when and if Mr. Stilling was returned to 
Salt Lake County (R. 237). 
Prior to May 17, 1985, Mr. Stilling was paroled from the 
Oregon State Prison and returned to Utah to begin serving his 
commitment on Weber County sentences in the Utah State Prison. Upon 
motion of the State, trial on the Salt Lake County cases was reset 
for September 3, 1985 (R. 91). Mr. Stilling was not rearraigned in 
circuit or district court nor was a preliminary hearing held. The 
matter was simply set for trial in district court as a continuation 
of the proceedings held in this case prior to his return to Oregon. 
On June 12, 1985, Mr. Stilling renewed his motion to 
dismiss based on the undecided aspect of his earlier motion that 
Salt Lake County had violated Article IV(c) of the I.A.D. by not 
trying him on its cases within 120 days after the arrest warrants 
were filed (R. 93). Mr. Stilling contended that because he was 
available to Salt Lake County the entire time he was in Utah, as 
evidenced by the County's success in transporting him to Salt Lake 
2 "Utah Code Annotated Section 77-29-5 is binding on Salt Lake 
County and by filing a detainer against the defendant the County has 
triggered its provisions." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
R. 259-261. 
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When Mr. Stilling was ultimately tried on the charges in 
this case after his return to the Utah State Prison to serve his 
sentence on the Weber County charges, the trial court continued the 
proceedings where it had left off prior to Mr. Stilling's return to 
Oregon. In the event this Court determines that the matter should 
not be dismissed due to a violation of Article IV of the I.A.D., Mr. 
Stilling nevertheless should be granted a new trial, including 
initial appearance and preliminary hearing in circuit court. 
The delay in bringing Mr. Stilling to trial violated his 
statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial as guaranteed 
by the Utah and United States Constitutions. The state experienced 
a "lapse" in its prosecution of Mr. Stilling, causing an 
unacceptable length of delay before trial for which there was no 
explanation. Mr. Stilling asserted his right to a speedy trial and 
was prejudiced by such delay. 
Mr. Stilling's right to a fair trial was violated by the 
trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the inherent 
weaknesses of eyewitness identification. Mr. Stilling was convicted 
solely on the basis of eyewitness identification about which there 
existed serious reliability questions. Failure to apply the 
standard set forth in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) 
violates Mr. Stilling's rights to due process and equal protection 
under the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
Mr. Stilling's constitutional rights against being put in 
double jeopardy were violated by the trial court's imposition of 
separate sentences for his aggravated robbery and habitual criminal 
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"(a) The appropr iate off icers of the jur isdi ction 
i n which an untried indictment, information or 
complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a 
prisoner against whom, he had lodged a detainer and 
who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party 
state made available in accordance with Article V(a) 
hereof upon presentation of a written request for 
temporary custody or availability to the appropriate 
authorities of the state in which the prisoner 
incarcerated, provided that the court having 
ji; irisdiction of such indictment, information 
complaint shall have duly approved, recorded ar.o 
transmitted the request; and provided further thci-
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt: ny 
the appropriate authorities before the request be 
honored, within which period the governor of the 
sending state may disapprove the request for thp 
temporary custody or availability, either \iv<~ r ' 
own motion or upon motion of the prisoner. 
Article IV (c) of the I.A.D. provides that trial shall be 
commenced within 120 days of the arrival in the receiving state 
where temporary custody is obtained pursuant to Article IV. Article 
IV (c) states: 
"(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by 
this article, trial shall be commenced within one 
hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner 
in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in 
open court, the prisoner or his counsel being 
present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter 
may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance." 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5 (IV)(a)(c) (emphasis added). 
Article V of the Act specifies the remedy for violation 
of the 120 day provision: 
In the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the 
detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial 
within the period provided in Article III or Article 
IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction 
where the indictment, information or complaint has 
been pending shall enter an order dismissing the 
same with prejudice and any detainer based therein 
shall cease to be of any force or effect. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5(V)(c) (1953 as amended). 
In the present case, Salt Lake County filed a detainer 
against Mr. Stilling with the Oregon authorities prior to July 23, 
1984 (R. 303). At that time, Mr. Stilling was in custody of Oregon 
officials. This detainer activated the I.A.D. in regard to the Salt 
Lake County charges pursuant to Article iv (a). Weber County also 
filed a detainer against Mr. Stilling, and on July 12, 1984, Weber 
County requested temporary custody (R. 303). 
Pursuant to the provisions of the I.A.D., after Weber 
County made its request for temporary custody, Oregon was required 
to "furnish to all other officers and appropriate courts in the 
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In United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 
56 L.Ed. 2d 329 (1978), the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
the I.A.D. is not limited to those cases where the receiving state's 
detainer is followed by a formal "request for temporary custody". 
In ruling that custody obtained by way of a writ of habeas corpus ad 
prosguendum, was covered by the I.A.D., the Court said "we view 
Article IV(c) as requiring commencement of trial within 120 days 
whenever the receiving State initiates the disposition of charges 
underlying a detainer it has previously lodged against a state 
prisoner." 436 U.S. 363, 98 S.Ct. 1849. 
The Court's opinion in Mauro makes no requirement that 
the disposition of charges be initiated with the sending state in 
order to activate the I.A.D. As the Court said in Mauro "Any other 
reading of this section would allow the Government to gain the 
advantages of lodging a detainer against a prisoner without assuming 
the responsibilities that the Agreement intended to arise from such 
an action." Id. at 364. 
The purpose behind Article IV of the I.A.D. is to insure 
speedy disposition of charges once a prisoner has been transferred 
to the receiving state. (See United States v. Mauro, supra at 336.) 
It does not make sense to allow the receiving state unlimited time 
in which to try a prisoner against whom it has lodged a detainer 
simply because it obtained custody of the prisoner from another 
county which was proceeding under the I.A.D. This would allow the 
receiving state to circumvent the protections of Article IV. 
By filing a detainer in Oregon and thereafter filing 
arrest warrants with Weber County based on the charges underlying 
- 10 -
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rights under the I.A.D. It did not undo the already completed 
violation of the Agreement. 
The State's position, that because Mr. Stilling never 
received his required hearing, he never came under the I.A.D. is 
logically inconsistent. With this line of reasoning, the state 
seems to be claiming that by violating the requirements of the 
I.A.D. often enough, they no longer have to play by the rules at all. 
After Mr. Stilling returned to Utah, Salt Lake County 
chose to start where it left off rather than informing him of the 
charges at an arraignment in circuit court, holding a preliminary 
hearing, and thereafter arraigning him in district court. By 
starting midstream, the trial court further acknowledged that the 
I.A.D. was activated when the warrants were initially filed with 
Weber County. Although Salt Lake County may have physically 
obtained Mr. Stilling from the Utah State Prison when it ultimately 
tried him on the charges in this case, the trial was a continuation 
of his initial transfer to Utah under the I.A.D. In computing the 
time period, the time Mr. Stilling was in Oregon should be tolled; 
however, the more than 156 days which ran prior to his return to 
Oregon must be added to the time computed after his return to Utah. 
Mr. Stilling was available for trial throughout the 
state's delay in bringing him to trial within the meaning of the 
I.A.D. (R. 104). It is standard practice for prisoners to be 
transported from Ogden to Salt Lake for trial (R. 229). Article 
IV(a) says "In determining the duration and expiration of the time 
periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the 
running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as 
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The remedy for violation of the 120 day provision of the 
Interstate Agreement on Detainers is dismissal with prejudice.3 
Article v(c) of the I.A.D., Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5(V)(c)(1953 as 
amended). 
Based on the requirements of the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers, Mr. Stilling asks that the charges against him be 
dismissed with prejudice as a result of the State's failure to bring 
him to trial within 120 days. To hold otherwise would allow a 
receiving State to circumvent the I.A.D. where a defendant faces 
more than one set of charges in that state. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
ARRAIGN MR. STILLING AND CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY 
HEARING AFTER HE WAS RETURNED TO THE STATE OF UTAH. 
On April 10f 1985, the trial judge ruled that Salt Lake 
County could not "legally obtain custody of the defendant for trial 
on the above charges by simply serving him with warrants while he 
was in Utah temporarily pursuant to the Weber County request for 
temporary custody" (R. 261). That same dayf the trial judge ordered 
"that all proceedings in the above matters be dismissed" (R. 262). 
When Mr. Stilling was returned to Utah in August 1985 to 
serve his Weber County sentences. Salt Lake County obtained custody 
of him from the Utah State prison and resumed its prosecution of 
him, not from the beginning, but rather where it left off when the 
3 "in the event that an action on the indictment, information or 
complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not 
brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or 
Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where 
the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall 
enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer 
based therein shall cease to be of any force or effect. U.C.A. 
77-29-5(V)(c) . 
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Sec. 13.
 LProsecution uy i.u formation ur indictment—Grand j.-! 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, 
shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment 
by a magistrate/ unless the examination be waived by the accused 
with the consent of the state, or by indictment, with or without 
such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury 
and the powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the 
Leg i s1a t u r e . (As amen de d N o vembe r 2, 194 8 , e ffeeti v e J a nua ry 1, 
19 49), (empha s i s a d de d ) 
5
 Utah Code Ann. 77-35-7(c). 
(d)(1) A preliminary examinatioi i sI Ia ] 1 be held in accordance with 
the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a 
court. The state shall have the burden of proof and be required to 
proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, 
the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present 
evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine the witnesses 
against him. If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause 
to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith order, ii I 
writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district 
court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in 
whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was 
acquired by unlawful means are not properly raised at the 
preliminary examination. If the magistrate does not find probable 
cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed or that 
the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the 
information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge shall not preclude the state from, 
instituting a subsequent pros<-^• 11": •-•>n f or f:he same of f ense . 
that the complaint should contain the crime charged and the 
jurisdictional facts. Pay at 305. 
In this case, Mr. Stilling went through his initial 
appearance, preliminary hearing and district court arraignment when 
Salt Lake County had no jurisdiction over him. The trial court did 
not specifically address the contention, but found instead that it 
had not dismissed Mr. Stilling's case, despite the order of April 
10, and that Mr. Stilling had simply been returned to Oregon because 
Salt Lake County did not have the authority to try him (R. 304). 
In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986), this 
Court stated "While the preliminary hearing is not a full-blown 
determination of an accused's guilt or innocence, it is nonetheless 
a "critical stage" in the criminal process, and proper consideration 
for a defendant's constitutional rights must be observed." In 
Brickey, the court found that the state could not continually 
subject a defendant to preliminary hearings without new evidence or 
changed circumstances. Id. at 647. 
In the present case, the same logic requires that Mr. 
Stilling be entitled to at least one legal pre-trial process. In 
the event this Court agrees with the finding of the trial judge that 
Salt Lake County had not legally obtained custody of Mr. Stilling, 
and therefore the matter should not be dismissed under Article IV of 
the I.A.D., the State should nevertheless be required to start at 
the beginning of the process after Salt Lake County did legally 
obtain custody, as required by Article I, Section 13 of the Utah 
Constitution and U.C.A. 77-35-7(c)(1953 as amended). As a result, 
this Court should find that the trial court incorrectly refused to 
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remand Mr. Stilling's case to circuit court for a legal bind-over, 
and reverse the case and remand for a new trial, including initial 
appearance and preliminary hearing in circuit court. The court 
could not find both that custody was not legal and yet use the 
initial appearance and preliminary hearing conducted during that 
illegal custody. 
POINT III. MR. STILLING'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY 
TRIAL WAS VIOLATED. 
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees that same 
right and Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1)(f) codifies the guarantee, 
providing in pertinent part: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions, the defendant is entitled: 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district where the offense is alleged to have 
been committed. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-1-6(1)(f )(1953 as amended). 
This Court has recognized that the right to speedy trial "under the 
Utah Constitution is no greater or less than its federal 
counterpart." State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1378 (Utah 1986). 
In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the United 
States Supreme Court adopted a balancing test in which the conduct 
of the prosecution and the defense are weighed. The court 
articulated a four prong test for determining whether an accused has 
been denied his federal constitutional right to a speedy trial. The 
factors to be considered are: (a) length of delay, (b) reason for 
the delay, (c) defendant's assertion of the right to a speedy trial, 
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and (d) prejudice to defendant as a result of the delay. The Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the Barker approach in State v. Hafen, 593 
P.2d 538 (Utah 1979) . 
The circumstances of the case are controlling in 
determining whether a delay is excessive. See Barker v. Wingo, 
supra at 530-31. The complexity of the charge is one factor to be 
considered in determining whether a delay is excessive. A longer 
delay is permissible in bringing a complex conspiracy case to trial 
than an ordinary street crime. Barker v. Wingo, supra at 531. 
In determining an acceptable length of delay under the 
speedy trial statutes, other provisions of Utah law provide some 
guidance. 
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Utah Code Ann. 
§77-29-5(v)(c), provides for a 120 day time limit from the time a 
request for temporary custody is filed. Utah's intrastate transfer 
statute, Utah Code Ann. §77-29-1(4) also places a 120 day time limit 
on the state beginning from the time a prisoner requests disposition 
of the relevant charges. 
In the case before the court, Mr. Stilling did not have 
his district court arraignment until 143 days after Salt Lake County 
filed arrest warrants with Weber County. 
This length of delay is longer than the time provided for 
by the Utah legislature in the I.A.D. context, and meets the first 
prong, unacceptable length of delay, of the Wingo test. 
The testimony of the officer involved in prosecuting Mr. 
Stilling's case indicates the reason for the delay was a "lapse" in 
his attention to Mr. Stilling's case (R. 1720). This type of 
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failure on the part of the prosecution should favor Mr. Stilling and 
fulfills the second prong of the Wingo test; an unacceptable reason 
for the delay. 
The facts indicate that Mr. Stilling began asserting his 
right to a speedy trial soon after he appeared before a judge in 
Salt Lake County (R. 47). Mr. Stilling testified that while he was 
incarcerated in Weber County, he continually tried to discover what 
was happening with the Salt Lake County charges (R. 1736-1737). Mr. 
Stilling contacted the Salt Lake Legal Defender office prior to 
being appointed counsel in that office to speed disposition of the 
Salt Lake County charges, and was told that the Salt Lake office 
could not help him until he was arraigned on the charges (R. 1737). 
As a result of these actions, Mr. Stilling asserted his right to a 
speedy trial as required by Wingo. 
Mr. Stilling's case also meets the last prong of the 
Wingo test. That prong requires that a defendant be prejudiced by 
the delay. A defendant who is incarcerated is prejudiced by such 
incarceration while awaiting trial. One of the rationales behind 
the interstate Agreement on Detainers is the prejudice that is 
caused by both the defendant and the criminal justice system when an 
accused is faced with a lack of finality and an inability to 
participate in prison programs. (See United States v. Mauro, supra 
at 342.) After Mr. Stilling was returned to Utah, his participation 
in prison rehabilitation programs was hampered by the still pending 
Salt Lake County charges (R. 1256). These facts indicate that Mr. 
Stilling was prejudiced by the failure of Salt Lake County to grant 
him a speedy trial. 
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Mr. Stilling's speedy trial rights under the Utah and 
United States Constitutions were violated by Salt Lake County's 
failure to bring him to trial within a reasonable time after filing 
arrest warrants with Weber County on September 19, 1984. 
POINT IV. MR. STILLINGfS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
WAS VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE WEAKNESSES OF EYEWITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION. 
Mr. Stilling was identified as the robber and convicted 
based on the eyewitness identification of John Arthur Thomas, night 
manager of Self's Foodland (R. 832-904). Although Mr. Stilling 
requested that a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction be 
given to the juryf the trial court declined the request. Mr. 
Stilling's case was tried five weeks prior to the court's decision 
in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). While this Court has 
taken the position that the decision in Long would be applied 
prospectively, to not apply such decision to Mr. Stilling's case 
violates his right to due process and equal protection of the laws 
under Article I, Sections 2 and 7 of the Utah Constitution and the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. , 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 
107 S.Ct. (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that 
the holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. , 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 
S.Ct. 1712 (1986) that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges 
to exclude blacks from a jury may violate equal protection should be 
applied retroactively. In Griffith v. Kentucky, supra, the Court 
noted that: 
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"failure to apply a newly declared 
constitutional rule to criminal cases pending 
on direct review violates basic norms of 
constitutional adjudication" 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 93 L.Ed.2d at 658. 
The Griffith court acknowledged that "after we have decided a new 
rule in a case selected, the integrity of the judicial review 
requires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on 
direct review . . . (and that) it is the nature of judicial review 
that precludes us from 'simply fishing one case from the stream of 
appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new 
constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar 
cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule1". 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added) Id. at 658. 
The Griffith Court also noted that "selective application 
of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated 
defendants the same" and that "the problem with not applying new 
rules to cases pending on direct review is 'the actual inequity that 
results when the court chooses which of many similarly situated 
defendants should be the chance beneficiary' of a new rule" 
(citations omitted). Id. at 658-659. 
The Griffith court went on to examine the "clear break" 
exception whereby courts had applied prospectively rules of criminal 
procedure deemed to be a "clear break" with precedent. The Court 
disapproved such a "clear break" exception and held "that a new rule 
for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied 
retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
review . . . with no exception for cases in which the new rule 
constitutes a "clear break" with the past". I<1. at 661. 
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In State v. Long, supra, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that the failure to give a cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction could deny the defendant due process of 
law under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. In the 
present case, the failure to give such an instruction violated Mr. 
Stilling's right to due process of law under the Utah Constitution 
and failure to apply Long retroactively where such a constitutional 
violation occurred violates Mr. Stilling's rights to due process and 
equal protection of the law under the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. (See Griffith v. Kentucky, supra). 
If the Long decision were applicable to this case, a 
cautionary instruction on eyewitness identification would be 
required. In State v. Long, supra at 492, this Court stated: 
"We therefore abandon our discretionary approach to 
cautionary instructions and direct that in cases 
tried from this date forward, trial courts shall 
give such an instruction whenever eyewitness 
identification is a central issue in a case and such 
an instruction is requested by the defense." 
The identification of Mr. Stilling was central to the case and the 
defense requested an instruction regarding the weaknesses of 
eyewitness identification. Such an instruction was necessary under 
the dictates of Long, and, had this case been tried six weeks later, 
such an instruction would be mandated by Long. 
In the event this Court maintains its decision to apply 
Long prospectively, the applicable standard for reviewing a trial 
court's failure to give an eyewitness identification instruction is 
as follows: 
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"Prior to Long, the law was that it lay within a 
trial judge's discretion whether an eyewitness 
identification instruction . . . was given, 
[citations omitted] However, this court also stated 
prior to Long that the failure to give an eyewitness 
instruction might be an abuse of discretion where 
there were serious questions about the reliability 
of the eyewitness identification. [citations 
omitted] (emphasis added). 
State v. Quevedo, 54 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (Utah 1987). 
In State v. Jonas, 725 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1986), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that a trial judge had abused his discretion in 
failing to give a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction 
based on a pre-Long standard. In Jonas, serious questions as to the 
reliability of the identification arose where (1) the victim had 
little opportunity to observe his assailant, (2) the witness 
initially described his assailant as clean-shaven, but later changed 
his description to include a moustache; (3) the witness described an 
assailant with a crooked nose yet selected a photo of the appellant, 
who did not have a crooked nose; (4) the victim's trial testimony 
showed that he was uncertain and hesitant in the way in which he 
selected the defendant during the photo array; and (5) there were no 
other witnesses or corroborating evidence. Id. 
In
 Quevedo, the court found that the trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion based on the pre-Long standard in refusing to 
give a cautionary instruction. In that case, four police officers, 
trained to make such identifications, positively identified the 
defendant at trial as the driver of a vehicle fleeing the scene of a 
robbery. One of the officers had known the defendant for three 
years. The officers located Quevedo in a nearby apartment, shortly 
after the fleeing getaway car crashed. An occupant of the apartment 
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stated, "I don't know what he done, he just ran in here." When 
arrested, Quevedo wore the same jacket that the fleeing driver had 
worn. 
The facts of this case are synonymous with the facts of 
Jonas and distinguishable from the facts of Quevedo. 
Mr. Thomas identified Mr. Stilling first from a photo 
array (R. 880-882). At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Thomas 
testified that he was about eighty-five percent certain the 
photograph of Mr. Stilling he chose from the photo array was that of 
the robber (State's Exhibit 9, Preliminary hearing, p. 6). In 
court, three years after the robbery occurred, Mr. Thomas said he 
was one-hundred percent sure Mr. Stilling was the robber (R. 857). 
Of the two checkers on duty at the time of the robbery, Stacey 
Roberts was completely unable to identify Mr. Stilling (R. 911) and 
the other checker, Wendy Sheldon said she was seventy percent sure 
Mr. Stilling was the robber (R. 951), despite the fact that she 
never saw his face (R. 961-962) but also that it was "very possible" 
that he was not (R. 965). When the male in the parking lot was 
asked whether he could see the robber in the courtroom, he replied 
no (R. 976). 
Also, the witness's recollections of the robber vary, 
with some witnesses saying the robber had light brown hair (R. 947, 
R. 975) and others describing his hair as dark brown (R. 871). None 
of the witnesses to the robbery saw the robber for more than five 
minutes (R. 911, R. 860-862, R. 966, R. 978-980) and two of the four 
witnesses admit to being under stress and afraid (R. 863, R. 959) 
during their observation. This level of observation is 
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significantly below that in Quevedo where the defendant 
wasidentified by trained police officers, one of whom was personally 
familiar with Quevedo. 
In its recent opinion in State v. Branch, Opinion No. 
20557 (September 17, 1987) this Court exhibited concern about 
finding that a trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give 
an eyewitness identification instruction where more than one witness 
identified the defendant. To draw a rigid rule based on the number 
of witnesses who tentatively identified a defendant does not 
directly address the question of whether in a given case the 
identification evidence raised serious questions as to reliability. 
In the present case, one of the witnesses who 
"identified" Mr. Stilling did not have the opportunity to see his 
face (R. 96); two others could not identify him in court (R. 911, 
976) and another was only seventy percent certain of her 
identification of Mr. Stilling as the person. Hence, although more 
than one witness existed, the testimony of such witnesses did not 
remove the serious question as to reliability of the eyewitness 
identification testimony. 
In State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980), this 
court said "Defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his 
theory of the crime if there is any basis in evidence to support 
that theory". In this case, the defense theory was a faulty 
eyewitness identification. This theory is supported by the 
hesitancy with which the witnesses identified Mr. Stilling. 
Corroborating evidence sufficient to overcome the serious 
doubt as to the identification of Mr. Stilling as the robber did not 
exist in this case. There was no additional evidence, physical or 
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otherwise, to place Mr. Stilling at the scene of the crime. None of 
the witnesses were trained observers familiar with the defendant as 
were the police officers in Quevedo. This case meets the 
requirement of Quevedo that there be "serious questions about the 
reliability of the eyewitness identification". As a result, the 
trial judge abused his discretion by refusing to give an eyewitness 
identification instruction. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY SENTENCED 
MR. STILLING BY IMPOSING SEPARATE SENTENCES FOR 
THE AGGRAVATED ROBBERY AND HABITUAL CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS. 
On January 30, 1987, Mr. Stilling was sentenced by the 
trial court to two concurrent sentences of five years to life; one 
for his conviction for aggravated robbery and the second sentence 
for his conviction under Utah's habitual criminal statute. 
Utah's habitual criminal statute, U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 
76-8-1001, 1002, provides for an enhanced sentence when a defendant 
is convicted under the statute. It states: 
76-8-1001. Habitual Criminal-Determination.-Any 
person who has been twice convicted, sentenced, and 
committed for felony offenses at least one of which 
offenses having been at least a felony of the second 
degree or a crime which, if committed within this 
state would have been a capital felony, felony of 
the first degree or felony of the second degree or a 
crime which, if committed within this state would 
have been a capital felony, felony of the first 
degree or felony of the second degree, and was 
committed to any prison may, upon conviction of at 
least a felony of the second degree committed in 
this state, other than murder in the first or second 
degree, be determined as a habitual criminal and be 
imprisoned in the state prison for from five years 
to life. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-8-1001 (1953 as amended). 
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This statute operates within the confines of the United States and 
Utah Constitutions, both of which contain double jeopardy 
provisions.6 
This Court recently noted that "increased penalties for 
recidivists do not represent punishment for earlier crimes and 
therefore do not violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy. 
Rather, the fact of the earlier crimes aggravates the commission of 
the latest crime, warranting the imposition of a longer sentence." 
State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 287 (Utah 1985) quoting Note, The 
Constitutionality of Statutes Permitting Increased Sentences for 
Habitual or Dangerous Criminals, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 356, 361 N.29 (1975). 
Mr. Stilling, however, was not given an enhanced or 
longer sentence following his conviction under the habitual criminal 
statute but rather was given a separate sentence of five to life to 
run concurrently with his five to life sentence for the underlying 
conviction of aggravated robbery. As a result, Mr. Stilling's 
double sentence fails to escape the double jeopardy challenge. 
This double sentence is also inconsistent with the 
enhancement purpose as delineated in State v. Bailey, supra, and 
State v. Carter, 578 P.2d 1275, 1277 (1978). In State v. Carter, 
supra, this court found the Utah statute constitutional but the 
b
 The Fourth IV Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: lf[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . ." United States 
Constitution, Amendment V. 
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides in pertinent 
part: " . . . nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense." 
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sentence in that case was a true enhancement, not an additional 
sentence as was imposed in Mr. Stilling's case. 
In Lopez v. State, 700 P.2d 16 (Idaho 1985), the Idaho 
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had made an error of law in 
imposing a separate sentence for a persistent violator conviction.7 
The Idaho Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in State v. 
Blevins, 697 P.2d 1253 (1985). The court said "[t]he judgment 
purports to impose two separate, albeit concurrent, life sentences -
one for the second degree murder and the other for the adjudication 
of persistent violator status. Our persistent violator statute, 
I.D. Sec. 19-2514, does not establish a separate offense nor does it 
authorize a separate sentence." Id. at 1258. 
The Utah statute is analogous to the Idaho statute. Both 
statutes impose the habitual criminal sentence following conviction 
of the third designated felony, not following sentencing for that 
felony. In order to avoid a constitutional deficiency, this court 
should read the Utah statute narrowly, as did the Idaho Court with 
the Idaho statute, and find that it does not allow a judge to impose 
a separate sentence for a habitual criminal conviction. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals reached a similar 
conclusion in People v. Early, 692 P.2d 1116 (Colo. App. 1984). The 
Court generalized about the purposes of habitual criminal statutes 
7 Idaho Code Section 19-2514 provides: "Persistent violator -
Sentence on third conviction for felony. - Any person convicted for 
the third time of the commission of a felony, whether the previous 
convictions were had within the state of Idaho or were had outside 
the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent violator of 
law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term in 
the custody of the state board of corrections which term shall be 
for not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life." 
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saying, "(r)ather than imposing a separate sentence for defendant's 
status, habitual criminal statutes merely substitute a different and 
more severe sentencing range than the penalty provided for in the 
criminal statute or statutes which were violated by defendant and 
which constitute the underlying offense or offenses." 
The trial court's decision to sentence Mr. Stilling twice 
violates the principle behind habitual criminal statutes as well as 
the double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Utah 
Constitutions. Mr. Stilling's aggravated robbery conviction was not 
enhanced by the habitual criminal sentence. His second five to life 
sentence can only be described as a second sentence for his three 
previous felonies. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons and any and all reasons 
set forth at oral argument, if any there be, Appellant respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his convictions and remand the case 
for dismissal or, in the alternative for a new trial. 
Alternatively, Appellant requests that this Court vacate his 
sentence and remand the case to the Third District Court with an 
order directing the District Court to correct its illegal sentence. 
DATED this -f; day of October, 1987. 
/JAfaES "C. BRADSHAW 
( Artorney for Appellant 
.
 ;M.---?'<>77 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
MAILED/DELIVERED eight copies of the foregoing to the 
Utah Supreme Court, Salt Lake City, Utah and four copies to the 
Attorney General's office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114 this day of October, 1987. 
I, , hereby certify that I delivered 
four copies of the foregoing to the Attorney General's Office 
this day of October, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM A 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
001 111985 
Clfiik. Supreme Court, Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondant, 
vs. 
STEVEN M. STILLINGS, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO 
APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY 
ORDER 
Case No.
 r ^ ^ ^ 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner Stillings is charged in Third District Court, 
Salt Lake Department with several aggravated robberies and other 
crimes in cases numbered CR85-176, CR85-177, CR85-178, CR85-179 
and CR85-180. 
On August 17, 1984, Mr. Stillings, then an inmate at the 
Oregon State Prison, was temporarily transferred to Utah to face 
criminal charges in Weber County. The transfer was effected pursuant 
to Article IV of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, §77-29-5, Utah 
Code Ann. (1982) (hereinafter cited as Agreement). Prior to the 
completion of proceedings in Weber County, Salt Lake County transferred 
Mr. Stillings to its jurisdiction for prosecution on the charges in 
the above cases. Subsequently, Judge Dee ruled that the transfer 
from Weber to Salt Lake Counties violated Article IV(a) of the Agree-
ment and he suspended further proceedings against Mr. Stillings. 
The judge ordered that officials return Mr. Stillings to Oregon. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by Judge David B. Dee, 
April 10, 1984, at 3 (hereinafter cited as Findings I). 
Soon after his return to Oregon, Mr. Stillings was again 
transferred to Utah to serve a committment at the Utah State Prison. 
The above cases were revived and Mr. Stillings now contends he was not 
tried by Salt Lake County during his initial presence in Utah within 
the 120 day period also mandated by Article IV(c) of the Agreement. 
He contends that failure entitles him to a dismissal of the present 
cases. Soon after his arrival back in Utah, Mr. Stillings moved 
Judg'e Dee to dismiss these cases based on the above grounds, and 
the Judge's denial of the motion is the basis of this petition. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to and during August, 1984, Mr. Stillings was incar-
cerated in the Oregon State Prison, Salem, Oregon. Weber County, 
on June 14, 1984, and Salt Lake County, on July 23, 1984, filed 
separate detainers (arrest warrants) on Mr. Stillings with Oregon 
prison officials. Under the Agreement, once a detainer has been filed, 
either the inmate may demand disposition of the charges underlying 
the detainer (Article III) or the receiving State may request 
temporary custody of the inmate for trial on the charges (Article IV). 
Or, the parties can take no action. If the receiving state opts 
to proceed under Article IV, the Agreement requires the inmate be 
tried within 120 days of his arrival in the state. 
On July 12, 1984, pursuant to Article IV(a) of the Agreement, 
Weber County requested temporary custody of Mr. Stillings for pro-
secution. Oregon officials made Mr. Stillings available to Utah 
Officials on August 17, 1984, and on that day he was transported to 
the Weber County Jail. From August 17, 1984 until sometime in April, 
1985, Mr. Stillings remained in Utah, housed either in the Weber or 
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Salt Lake County Jails. The Weber County proceedings lasted until 
February 13, 1985, on which day Mr. Stillings entered guilty pleas 
to reduced charges and was sentenced to three one to fifteen 
indeterminate terms in the Utah State Prison. 
On September 19, 1984, Salt Lake County initiated its 
prosecution of Mr. Stillings by filing arrest warrants with Weber 
County Jail officials. It then transported Mr. Stillings to Salt 
Lake County on January 14, January 29, and February 8, 1985, for his 
initial appearance, preliminary hearing and arraignment, respectively, 
on the above-named cases. At each Salt Lake appearance, Mr. Stillings 
moved to dismiss all Salt Lake County cases on the ground that the 
120 day period within which he must be tried after arriving in Utah, 
dictated in Article IV(c) of the Agreement, had run. After each 
appearance, he was immediately returned to the Weber County Jail. 
When the Weber County cases ended on February 13, 1985, Mr. Stillings 
was relocated in the Salt Lake County Jail. Trial on the Salt Lake 
County cases was set for March 4, 1985 before the Honorable David B. 
Dee. 
On February 21, 1985, Mr. Stillings moved the District Court 
to dismiss the Salt Lake County charges on the grounds that the County 
had not followed proper procedures outlined in the Agreement when it 
went forward with its prosecution and obtained custody of him. He 
argued that under the Agreement he was entitled to have Oregon officials 
review Salt Lake County's desire to prosecute him. He also reiterated 
his argument that the County had failed to bring him to trial within 
the 120 day period mandated by the Agreement. 
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In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Judge Dee, on April 
10f 1985, ruled that Salt Lake County, by transferring Mr. Stillings 
from Weber County to Salt Lake County without first filing a request 
for temporary custody pursuant to Article IV(a) of the Agreement, 
had violated Mr, Stillings right to a review of the transfer by 
Oregon's governor as set out in Article IV(a). In support of his 
ruling, Judge Dee found th&t by filing a detainer on Mr. Stillings 
while he was incarcerated in Oregon, Salt Lake County had triggered 
application of the Agreement and was bound by its provisons. Findings I 
at 2 . Those provisions require such a review. 
To satisfy the requirements of the Agreement, Judge Dee ordered 
that Petitioner be immediately returned to Oregon. Xcl. at 3 . The 
Judge reserved ruling on the 120 day issue when and if Mr. Stillings was 
returned to Utah. Oral Ruling at Hearing on Motion to Dismiss, 
March 18, 1985. 
Sometime before May 17, 1985, Mr. Stillings was paroled from 
Oregon State Prison and returned to Utah to begin serving his commit-
tment to the Utah State Prison. Upon motion of the State, trial on 
the Salt Lake County cases was reset for September 3, 1985. 
On June 12, 1985, Mr. Stillings renewed his motion to dismiss 
based on the unargued aspect of his earlier motion that Salt Lake 
County had violated Article IV(c) of the Agreement by not trying him 
on its cases within 120 days of his arrival in Utah. Mr. Stillings 
contended that because he was available to Salt Lake County the entire 
time he was in Utah, as evidenced by the County's success in trans-
porting him to Salt Lake County for court appearances while the Weber 
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County cases were pending, and because Salt Lake County in fact 
proceeded with its prosecution against him, the 120 day period 
should have commenced against Salt Lake County upon his arrival 
in Utah. He argued additionally that the Oregon officials, when 
they were served with Salt Lake County's detainer, should have 
informed Salt Lake County of Weber County's request for temporary 
custody and authorized Weber County to release Mr. Stillings to 
Salt Lake County officials. Mr. Stillings contended that under the 
Agreement it was his right to have all the detainers filed against 
him by a demanding state resolved while he was in that state. 
Oregon's failure to facilitate that resolution denied Mr. Stillings 
the protection accorded him by the Agreement and the only viable 
mechanism to redress that denial is to hold that the time period 
began running against Salt Lake County at the same time it began 
against Weber County - August 17, 1984, the date he arrived in Utah. 
To ensure that both the spirit and the letter of the Agreement is 
carried out courts have held that the receiving state must bear the 
consequences of the improper actions of the sending state. State 
v. Lincoln, 601 p.2d 641 (Colo. 1978) . 
Additionally, Mr. Stillings contended that the present case 
closely paralled the facts in United States v. Ford, 436 U.S. 340, 
56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) , and that the Ford decision mandated dismissal 
of the Salt Lake County charges. Once the Agreement is triggered, 
which occurred when Salt Lake County filed its detainer in Oregon, 
then the 120 day period commences when the receiving State initiates 
disposition of its charges. 436 U.S. at 364. Salt Lake County 
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initiated disposition of its charges on September 19, 1984, by serving 
its arrest warrants on Petitioner in the Weber County Jail. It 
then continued in January, 1985, what it had started on September 
19, 1984, by bringing Mr. Stillings down to Salt Lake County for 
various court appearances. Salt Lake County thus took advantage of 
the beneficial aspects of the Agreement by attempting to try Mr. 
Stillings while he was in Utah, but is arguing that it should not be 
made to live up to its responsibilities under the Agreement to try 
him within 120 days. This is precisely the situation that the Ford 
case addressed and found to be an unacceptable violation of the 
Agreement. Id. Thus, if the 120 day period did not begin to run 
against Salt Lake County upon Mr. Stillings arrival in Utah on August 
17, 1984, then it must have begun on September 19, 1984, when Salt 
Lake County began its prosecution of Mr. Stillings by arresting him. 
After hearing argument, Judge Dee denied Mr. Stillings motion 
to dismiss. Mr. Stillings contends that that ruling unfairly permitted 
Salt Lake County to make use of the Agreement at the expense of his 
rights contained therein. 
QUESTIONS OF LAW 
Mr. Stillings does not contest the propriety of Judge Dee's 
conclusions of law contained in Findings I. He will assume for 
purposes of this section, that those conclusions are correct. Based 
on that assumption, there are only two questions of law presented to 
this court: 
Under the facts of this case is the State of Utah, by and 
through Salt Lake County, bound by the 120 day time period contained 
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in Article IV(c) of the Agreement, and, if so, had that time period 
run by the March 4, 1984 trial setting? 
If the 120 day time is applicable, and had run by the March 
4, 1984 trial setting, should the present cases be dismissed with 
prejudice? 
WHY IMMEDIATE APPEAL SHOULD BE PERMITTED 
The above issues can and should be decided prior to rather 
than after trial on the present charges. They can be decided prior 
to trial because they require no findings of fact or conclusions of 
law which would have to be elicited at trial. The issues in this 
Petition are completely independant of any issues that would be 
raised at trial. They should be decided prior to trial so as to avoid 
lengthy and expensive trials on the substantive charges. The Salt 
Lake County charges involve five separate informations. Each infor-
mation contains allegations of armed robbery, theft, possession of 
a firearm by a restricted person and being a habitual criminal. Mr. 
Stillings will move the trial court to sever the firearm count from 
the others and anticipates that said motion will be granted. State 
v. Saunders, No. 19054 (Filed April 3, 1985). Because the code 
requires a separate trial also on the habitual criminal charge, it 
will take fifteen (15) jury trials to fully and fairly adjudicate 
the charges in the five informations. To present an adequate defense, 
Mr. Stillings also anticipates moving the trial court for costs to 
bring in out-of-state witnesses. Fifteen jury trials with attendant 
costs is an obvious burden on the State of Utah and on the defense, 
particularly on the out-of-state witnesses. It is also a great 
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psychological burden on Mr. Stillings. If there is any hope that 
this Court would reverse Judge Dee's ruling and order the charges 
dismissed, then this should occur prior to the trials rather than 
after. 
APPEAL WILL MATERIALLY ADVANCE TERMINATION OF 
LITIGATION 
If this Court reverses the District Court's ruling the 
Agreement mandates that the charges be dismissed. That result would 
obviously do more than merely materially advance termination of the 
litigation. If this Court upholds Judge Dee's ruling and these cases 
are reset for trial, the defense will be forced to rethink its plea 
bargaining position due to the fact that these issues constitute 
the main feature of Mr. Stillings' defense. The defense would be much 
more inclined to accept a reasonable offer and that result is indeed 
a material step toward terminating the cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner requests this Court to review Judge Dee's denial of 
his Motion to Dismiss the charges in the present cases on the ground 
he was not brought to trial within the 120 day period mandated by the 
Agreement. Said request is based on the reasoning contained in United 
States v. Ford, supra, which dictates that Salt Lake County is bound 
by the time period and that said period had run well before a trial 
date was set. The issue was timely raised below and would materially 
advance the termination of litigation by either terminating the cases 
by an order of dismissal or cause the petitioner to seriously re-
evaluate his plea bargaining position. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this • ' / * day of October, 1985 
itU^fr 
THOMAS J. McgO 
Attorney f9r Petitioner 
Salt Lake" Legal Defender Assn, 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from an Interloctutory Order to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State 
Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this It day 
of October, 1985. 
^ ^ ' 1 ^ 
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ADDENDUM B 
77-29-5, Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment into law 
— Text of agreement. The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby 
enacted into law and entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions 
legally joining therein in the form substantially as follows: 
The contracting states solemnly agree that 
ARTICLE I 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, 
detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and 
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other 
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party 
states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and 
orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status 
of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or 
complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to 
such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, 
cannot properly be had in the absence of co-operative procedures. It is the 
further purpose of this agreement to provide such co-operative procedures. 
ARTICLE II 
As used in this agreement 
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States 
of America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of 
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcer-
ated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant 
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availabil-
ity is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof. 
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had 
on an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Arti-
cle IV hereof. 
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ARTICLE III 
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a 
penal or correctional institution of a party state, anH^henevVr"durmgfthe 
continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other 
party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis 
of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be 
brought to trial within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered 
to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting 
officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and 
his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, informa-
tion or complaint; provided that for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the 
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request 
of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate 
official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment 
under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time 
remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, 
the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state 
parole agency relating to the prisoner. 
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in 
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, 
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who 
shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate 
prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt 
requested. 
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having 
custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and con-
tents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his 
right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information 
or complaint on which the detainer is. based 
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all 
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which 
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose 
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. 
The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody 
of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers 
and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the 
prisoner's request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being 
initiated by the prisoner Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph 
shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, 
and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information or 
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the 
original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information or complaint 
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shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to 
a paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition 
with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included 
therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to 
the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after 
completion of his term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request 
for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the 
production of his body in any court where his presence may be required 
in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent 
voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accord-
ance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph 
shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permit-
ted by law. 
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of 
the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall 
void the request 
ARTICLE IV 
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried 
indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have 
a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a 
term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance 
with Article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for tempo-
rary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in 
which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdic-
tion of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly 
approved, recorded and transmitted the request; and provided further that 
there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authori-
ties before the request be honored, within which period the governor of 
the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or 
availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner. 
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in para-
graph (a) hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in cus-
tody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of 
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already 
served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of 
good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any 
decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authori-
ties simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts 
in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with 
similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for cus-
tody or availability and of the reasons therefor. 
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(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall 
be commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the pris-
oner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the 
prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the 
matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any 
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his deliv-
ery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be 
opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the send-
ing state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint con-
templated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original 
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) hereof, such indictment, 
information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and 
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. 
ARTICLE V 
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, 
the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver tempo-
rary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state 
where such indictment, information or complaint is pending against such 
person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the 
request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary 
custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of 
this agreement In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority 
in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided 
by this agreement, or to the prisoner's presence in federal custody at the 
place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the 
custodian. 
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of 
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand: 
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the 
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given. 
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint 
on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of 
which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made. 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary 
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been 
lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or 
Article IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the 
indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an 
order dismissing the same with-prejudice, and any detainer based thereon 
shall cease to be of any force or effect. 
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(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only 
for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges con-
tained in one or more untried indictments, informations or complaints 
which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on 
any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except 
for his attendance at court and while being transported to or from any 
place at which his presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held 
in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting pros-
ecution. 
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this 
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state. 
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner 
is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, 
time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall 
be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and prac-
tice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow. 
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as 
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to 
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state 
and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same 
manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any 
other manner permitted by law. 
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pur-
suant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory 
and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more 
untried indictments, informations or complaints are pending or in which 
trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay 
all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping and returning the prisoner. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned 
shall have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a differ-
ent allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among them-
selves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any 
internal relationship among the departments, agencies and officers of and 
in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdi-
visions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor. 
ARTICLE VI 
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time peri-
ods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said 
time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is 
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of 
the matter. 
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by 
this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally 
ilL 
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ARTICLE VH 
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting 
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and 
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this 
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, informa-
tion necessary to the effective operation of this agreement 
ARTICLE VIE 
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state 
when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agree-
ment may withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. How-
ever, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any 
proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time 
such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect 
thereof. 
ARTICLE IX 
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its pur-
poses. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any 
phrase, clause, sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be 
contrary to the Constitution of any party state or of the United States or 
the applicability thereof to any government; agency, person or circum-
stance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and 
the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person or circum-
stance shall not be affected thereby* If this agreement shall be held con-
trary to the Constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall 
remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force 
and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters. 
ADDENDUM C 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
STEVEN M. STILLINGS, 
Defendant-Petitioner. 
ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION 
TO APPEAL FROM AN 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
Case No. 20480 
COMES NOW the State of Utah, plaintiff-respondent 
in the above-entitled matter, by and through counsel, Earl 
F. Dorius, Assistant Attorney General, and hereby files 
this Answer in Opposition to Defendant-Petitioner's Petition 
for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order pursuant 
to Rule 5(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF THE 
INTERSTATE AGREEMENT ON DETAINERS, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-5 (1953) 
AS AMENDED, THAT WOULD WARRANT 
DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGES PRESENTLY 
PENDING AGAINST DEFENDANT-PETITIONER. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant-petitioner's 
Statement of Facts in his Petition is correct, there has been 
no violation by the prosecution of the Interstate Agreement 
of Detainers (IAD), Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5 (1953), as 
amended, to justify dismissal of the charges presently 
pending against him. 
He asserts he was incarcerated in an Oregon 
penitentiary when the Weber County Attorney requested 
temporary custody of him under Article IV of the IAD 
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5) to try him on certain charges they 
had pending against him. He was transferred to Weber County 
where he subsequently pled guilty to the charges and was 
sentenced to the Utah State Prison on or about February 13, 
1985. He claims no irregularity with these proceedings under 
the IAD. 
However, while he was incarcerated in the Weber 
County Jail, as a pre-trial detainee on the Weber County 
charges, the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office commenced 
criminal proceedings which they had pending against him. 
On February 21, 1985, petitioner moved to dismiss those 
charges, relying on two theories which are wholly inconsist-
ent with each other: (1) that Salt Lake officials had not 
properly presented an Article IV, IAD request for temporary 
custody to Oregon officials to secure custody to try him, 
and (2) the 120-day period provided for in Article IV of 
the IAD in which the prosecutors must bring him to trial had 
run. The latter argument would clearly be frivolous if the 
former argument prevailed for if there had not been on Article IV 
request for temporary custody, the 120-day period under 
Article IV would never have commenced. Judge David B. Dee 
agreed with petitioner's first theory, granted his motion to 
dismiss, and ordered his return to Oregon to allow Oregon 
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officials the opportunity to first review any request for 
temporary custody which might then be made by Salt Lake 
officials. This ruling clearly comports with the pro-
visions of Article IV of the IAD. 
Thereafter, no request for temporary custody was 
ever made by Salt Lake officials because petitioner was soon 
paroled by Oregon authorities and he was returned to Utah to 
commence serving his prison sentences on the Weber County 
convictions. (Nor did petitioner at any time ever attempt to 
pursue any remedies available to him under Article III of the 
IAD to dispose of the Salt Lake charges). 
Once petitioner was incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison the terms of the IAD no longer applied, and any remedy 
for prompt disposition of any other Utah charges pending 
against him would lie under Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1953) 
as amended. Petitioner did not avail himself of this provision. 
Salt Lake County officials soon renewed their prosecu-
tion. Petitioner also renewed his Motion to Dismiss claiming 
the 120-day period under Article IV (c) of the IAD had run. 
His Motion was denied by the trial court, and it is this 
ruling he seeks to appeal. 
Petitioner contends that because he was "available" 
to Salt Lake County during the time he was in Utah being held 
on the Weber County charges, the Article IV (c) 120-day period 
should be deemed to have commenced upon his arrival in Utah. 
This position goes far beyond the terms of the IAD. One re-
ceiving State prosecutor's decision to prosecute charges 
-3-
and obtain temporary custody of a defendant under Article IV 
of the IAD is in no way binding on other prosecutors in the 
receiving State• Although Article IV (b) requires that 
correctional officers in the sending State notify other 
prosecutors in a receiving State (who have also lodged 
detainers against an inmate) that a fellow prosecutor in 
their state has requested temporary custody and that the 
prisoner is being made available to that prosecutor, there 
is no mandate that the other prosecutors also bring that 
inmate to trial during that period. The provision is infor-
mational only in the event the other prosecutors might choose 
to file their own Article IV request for temporary custody, 
and that was not done in this case. The provision in Article 
IV (b) does not create a right of disposition of charges for 
a prisoner. Article IV is the prosecutor's half of the IAD. 
Any right the petitioner might have to have the charges 
disposed of lies within Article III of the IAD, and nothing 
would have precluded petitioner from filing an Article III 
request for disposition of the Salt Lake charges during that 
period. He did not do so and instead chose to do the opposite 
by moving to dismiss the Salt Lake charges on the ground that 
no proper Article IV request had been made by the Salt Lake 
prosecutor. He is thus not in a position to claim a denial 
of any right he may have had to have the Salt Lake charges 
brought to trial. Whether Oregon officials did or did not 
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notify other Utah officials of Petitioner's availability for 
prosecution under Article IV (b) accordingly should not serve 
as a basis for dismissal of the Salt Lake charges. 
Petitioner's latest claim that the 120 days should 
be deemed to have run because "he was available to Salt Lake 
County the entire time he was in Utah" also flies in the face 
of his earlier argument that he was not available for prosecu-
tion and should have been returned to Oregon because an 
Article IV request had not been made by Salt Lake authorities. 
He prevailed on this claim and should be bound by that argu-
ment. He should be precluded from having it both ways. 
Finally, petitioner claims United States v. Mauro, 
436 U.S. 340 (1978)1, mandates dismissal of the Salt Lake 
charges. He claims that once the application of the IAD 
is triggered (when Salt Lake County filed its detainer with 
Oregon Correctional authorities), then the 120-day period 
commences when the "receiving State" initiates disposition 
of its charges. He overreads both the IAD and Mauro. 
The Mauro. court (in Mr. Ford's case) merely held 
that the United States is a party to the IAD, and that when 
the federal government demands that a State correctional 
official make a State- prisoner available for prosecution and 
obtains custody by way of a writ of habeas corpus ^ d prosequendum, 
1 Petitioner miscites the case as "United States v. Ford" 
in his petition. Mr. Ford's case was joined with Mr. Maurofs 
on appeal. 
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it has effectually activated Article IV of the IAD and it must 
bring the prisoner to trial within 120 days as required by 
Article IV (c). The writ was viewed as tantamount to a "written 
request for temporary custody" within the meaning of Article 
IV (a). Mr. Ford, unlike petitioner, had also made repeated 
requests for a speedy trial. In petitioner's case, no 
semblance of any request for temporary custody was ever made 
by Salt Lake officials on Oregon officials. Thus, Article IV 
was never triggered at all. 
Based upon the foregoing, petitioner's Petition for 
interlocutory appellate review should be denied. 
DATED this 21st day of October, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Answer in Opposition to Petition for 
Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, postage 
prepaid, to Thomas J. McCormick, attorney for petitioner, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 333 South Second East, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this jSsiA day of October, 1985. 
